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February 10, 2005 
 
I am pleased to testify on the subject of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. For the fourth 
Congress in a row, this body will be considering a bankruptcy reform bill that would 
bring balance and sanity to a bankruptcy system that is threatening to spiral out of 
control. Last year, consumer bankruptcy filings exceeded 1.6 million for the first time. 
Clearly the time is right to address some of the problems of fraud and abuse that is 
endemic in the current bankruptcy system. Recognizing this, I am pleased to see that this 
Committee has acted promptly to introduce a bankruptcy reform Bill and to hold hearings 
on the issue. I am pleased to provide my views on the matter. I am currently a Visiting 
Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. From 2003-04, I served an 
appointment as the Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade 
Commission, where I assisted in helping to shape FTC policy on matters of consumer 
credit, subprime lending, and related topics. I hold both a J.D. and a Master's Degree in 
Economics. I was also a John M. Olin Fellow in Law & Economics at the University of 
Virginia and am a tenured member of the faculty at George Mason University School of 
Law, one of the premier centers for the study of economic analysis of law. In addition to 
my publications in law reviews, I have also published several articles in peer-reviewed 
economics journals. As such, I believe that I am in a sound position to discuss both the 
legal and economic aspects of the current bankruptcy system as well as the probably 
effects of the bankruptcy reform Bill. 
 
This Bill represents a thoughtful and well-considered effort to address many of the 
problems that are manifest in the bankruptcy system today. The Bill makes incremental 
reforms to the consumer bankruptcy system to address many of the loopholes and 
technicalities that opportunistic debtors have found to evade their financial and personal 
responsibilities. The reforms provided for by this Bill are grounded in common-sense and 
experience derived from the observation of the day-to-day operation of the bankruptcy 
system in practice. 
 
The current system has been little-changed since its enactment in 1978. Since that time 
the number of personal bankruptcies is roughly five times larger than when the Code was 
enacted. Today, some 1.6 million Americans troop through the bankruptcy courtrooms 
every year. This growth in numbers has been matched by a growing sophistication among 
lawyers and the public about the opportunities for fraud and abuse--both legal and illegal-
-in the bankruptcy system. Few reasonable observers believe that even a small fraction of 
the fraud and abuse present in the system is caught. As a result, similarly-situated debtors 
and creditors throughout the country suffer from dissimilar and unpredictable treatment 
on the basis of accident of geography or judicial whim. By guaranteeing unequal 
treatment for similarly-situated individuals, the system mocks the rule of law. In turn, this 
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undermines public confidence that the bankruptcy system is operating fairly and 
efficiently. Instead, it is increasingly viewed as a system prone to cynicism and 
manipulation, and a free- ride for debtors lacking in conscience and personal 
responsibility. In a forthcoming law review article, I systematically examine the factors 
that have caused the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings in recent years. See Todd J. 
Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, ___ 
NORTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW ___ (Forthcoming 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=587901 . The Figures presented in 
this Testimony are drawn from that article. In the Appendix to this Testimony I present 
additional discussion of the causes of the consumer bankruptcy crisis. 
 
As Figure 1 indicates, although bankruptcy filings were low and generally cyclical for 
most of the Twentieth Century there has been a stunning increase in consumer 
bankruptcy filing rates during the past twenty-five years, which has increased at 
accelerating rates over the past two decades. 
 
Source: Bankruptcy Filings, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts; Number Households, U.S. 
Census Bureau As Figure 3 indicates, the per capita bankruptcy rate in America has 
dramatically risen over time, accelerating in the 1980s and 1990s. The total number of 
bankruptcies more than doubled during the 1980s and then doubled again from 1990 to 
2003, such that by 2003 annual consumer bankruptcy filings were five times higher in 
2003 than just twenty year earlier. This rapid increase in filings has been especially 
difficult to explain in light of the prosperous state of the American economy during most 
of the past two decades, and especially, the extraordinary prosperity of the late 1990s. 
Although the American economy set new records for economic growth, low 
unemployment, and low interest rates, this was matched by record-high bankruptcy 
filings as well. 
 
It is thus evident from this, and the evidence presented in the Appendix to this 
Testimony, that today the consumer bankruptcy system today is no longer being used as a 
"last resort" for consumers. Instead, the anomaly of record-high bankruptcy filings after 
almost 20 years of uninterrupted economic prosperity indicates the need to reconsider 
America's consumer bankruptcy rules. 
 
The current system suffers from a crisis of both real and perceived abuse. This Bill 
addresses both of these problems. This Bill rebalances the bankruptcy system, by taking 
sensible steps to address many of the most prominent abuses by both debtors and 
creditors that have been manifested in recent years. At the same time, it preserves the 
commitment to the fresh start for all debtors who need it. By preserving the fresh start but 
also addressing abusive behavior, this Bill will restore fairness and efficiency to the 
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bankruptcy system and thereby restore public confidence in the system. A failure to act in 
a sensible and rational way today will lead to continuing abuse and continuing public 
frustration. Acting sensibly today will head-off more drastic and ill-considered action 
later. 
 
Being pro-debtor is not the same as being pro-consumer. When some people get a free-
ride in bankruptcy, the rest of us are forced to pick up the slack. The overwhelming 
majority of Americans pay their Bills and live up to their financial responsibilities. But it 
should not be forgotten that those who pay their Bills inevitably have to pay more to 
make up for those who do not. Bankruptcy losses are a cost of business. Like all other 
business expenses, when creditors are unable to collect debts because of bankruptcy, 
some of those losses are inevitably passed on to responsible Americans who live up to 
their financial obligations. Every phone bill, electric bill, mortgage, furniture purchase, 
medical bill, and car loan contains an implicit bankruptcy "tax" that the rest of us pay to 
subsidize those who do not pay their bills. Exactly how much of these bankruptcy losses 
is passed on from lenders to consumer borrowers is unclear, but economics tells us that at 
least some of it is. We all pay for bankruptcy abuse in higher down payments, higher 
interest rates, and higher costs for goods and services. 
 
This bankruptcy "tax" takes many forms. It is obviously reflected in higher interest rates. 
But it is also reflected in higher down-payment requirements, as creditors desire greater 
up- front payments to reduce the risk of nonpayment. It is reflected in shorter grace 
periods for paying bills and higher penalty fees and late-charges for those who miss 
payments. Finally, it is reflected in fewer benefits to consumers, whether the co-branding 
benefits offered by credit cards today or such things as greater customer service or 
extended business hours. Retailers raise their prices or close their credit operations. 
Hospitals and other medical providers are forced to restrict services or increase prices 
still higher to compensate for unpaid medical debts. Regardless of which of these forms it 
takes, it is evident that the rest of us suffer when some people choose not to pay their 
bills. 
 
Moreover, it is lower-income and fixed-income Americans who suffer the most, as it is 
they who already have the fewest credit choices and the least ability to absorb increased 
credit and other costs that result from avoidable bankruptcy losses. When furniture stores 
are forced to discontinue their credit operations because of bankruptcy losses, or when 
department stores are forced to raise prices to offset losses due to bankruptcy, lower-
income Americans are hurt the most. When upper- income individuals file bankruptcy 
and walk away from debts that they could pay but choose not to, the bill gets sent to you, 
me, young, and low-income Americans alike. I cannot see any reason why lower-income 
Americans should pay a higher price for goods, services, or credit simply to preserve the 
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privilege of upper- middle class Americans to shirk financial obligations that they can 
pay. Consumers as a whole, and especially low-income consumers, are not made better-
off when bankruptcy losses increase prices and decrease service. 
 
Creditors also lose from a runaway bankruptcy system. Smaller businesses and small 
creditors suffer the most from a runaway bankruptcy system, as they tend to have the 
narrowest margins and the least ability to spread those losses among their customers. The 
small-town furniture store selling couches and end tables on credit suffers a lot when his 
customers don't pay up. As do independent car salesmen, jewelers, contractors, and other 
small businesses who extend credit to their customers. Thus, it is not surprising that 
support for bankruptcy reform comes from across the full spectrum of creditors, but small 
creditors, such as small retailers and credit unions, are among the strongest supporters of 
bankruptcy reform. 
 
The Bill will also reinforce the lesson that bankruptcy is a moral as well as an economic 
decision. Filing bankruptcy reflects a decision to break a promise made to reciprocate a 
benefit bestowed upon you. The moral element of bankruptcy is reflected in the 
observation that the English word "credit" comes from the Latin word for "trust." Parents 
seek to teach their children values of personal and financial responsibility, and promise-
keeping and reciprocity provide the foundation of a free economy and healthy civil 
society. Regrettably, the personal shame and social stigma that once restrained 
opportunistic bankruptcy filings has declined substantially in recent years. We have 
"defined bankruptcy deviancy downward" such that it has become a convenient financial 
planning tool, rather than a decision freighted with moral and social significance. 
Requiring those who can to repay some of their debts as a condition for bankruptcy relief 
sends an important signal that bankruptcy is a serious act that has moral as well as 
economic consequences. Moreover, reducing the number of strategic bankruptcies will 
reduce the bankruptcy tax paid by every American family on goods and services, giving 
them more money for groceries, vacations, and educational expenses. 
 
The Bill establishes a much-needed system of means-testing to force high-income debtors 
who can repay a substantial portion of their debts without significant hardship to do so. 
Under current law, there are few checks on high-income debtors seeking to walk away 
from their debts and few safeguards to prevent bankruptcy fraud. Current law requires a 
case-by-case investigation that turns on little more than the personal predilections of the 
judge. The Bill narrows the judge's discretion by establishing a presumption of abuse 
where a high-income debtor has the ability to repay a substantial portion of his debts, as 
measured by an objective standard. At the same time, the judge will retain discretion to 
override this presumption in cases of hardship. Means-testing is not a panacea for all of 
the ills of the bankruptcy system. But by focusing judicial discretion on the existence of 
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real hardship and reducing procedural hurdles to challenging abuse, the Bill's reforms 
will vindicate the rule of law and reduce abuse. 
 
By targeting high-income bankrupts with substantial repayment capacity, it is estimated 
that means-testing will recover roughly $3 million of the $40 million discharged in 
bankruptcy every year. Although means-testing will affect only 7-10% of bankruptcy 
filers, but focusing scrutiny on those high-income debtors who can repay a substantial 
portion of their debts without significant hardship, the Bill makes possible the recovery of 
substantial losses with minimal administrative cost. Equally important, means-testing will 
have no effect on those making less than the minimum income threshold provided. Thus, 
for the 80% of filers whose income lies beneath the state median, means-testing will have 
no effect whatsoever. 
 
It should also be stressed that means-testing will not prevent anyone from filing 
bankruptcy and receiving a bankruptcy discharge. Instead, it will simply condition the 
discharge for affected filers to pursuing a chapter 13 repayment plan rather than going 
into chapter 7. In fact, the means-testing rules will simply govern eligibility for chapter 7 
relief; it has no impact on the confirmation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan. In approving 
the debtor's plan the court will still apply the budgetary processes provided for under 
current law without any consideration of the means-testing eligibility rules. 
 
The means-testing provisions also provide an excellent example of the Bill's incremental 
and balanced approach to the problem of abuse and fraud in the system. Under current 
law, it is already the case that the primary factor for courts to consider in deciding 
whether to dismiss a debtor's case for substantial abuse under --707(b) is whether the 
debtor can repay a substantial portion of his debts without significant hardship. 
Overwhelmed by the number of cases they confront and lacking the will to enforce its 
provisions consistently, however, it has been observed by one scholar that many 
perceive--707(b) to be a "dismal failure." Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Means- Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105 (1998). The Bill simply 
creates a more formal and reliable mechanism for implementing the goals that bankruptcy 
courts are already seeking to apply, but will do so in a way that more efficient and fair 
than the current system. See Edith H. Jones and Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-
Testing, 1999 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY L. REV. 177. 
 
In addition, the Bill strikes at the most prominent abuses concerning the unlimited 
homestead exemption. It prevents opportunism by debtors who move from one state to a 
state with an unlimited homestead exemption immediately prior to filing bankruptcy by 
imposing a lengthy waiting period on their ability to avail themselves of the new state's 
exemption. This extended waiting period thus eliminates the largest objection to the a 
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state-based exemption regime, as empirical evidence plainly demonstrates that credit 
markets operate in such a manner to keep most of the cost of excessive exemptions 
within the state, thereby eliminating interstate spillovers. See Reint Gropp, John Karl 
Scholz, and Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 
Q. J. ECON. 217 (1997). As a result, while excessive exemptions may be bad policy in 
that they raise the cost of credit and reduce access to credit, this tradeoff is arguably one 
that falls within the discretion of the various states. Second, the Bill would create a 10 
year statute of limitations to attack fraudulent use of the homestead exemption. Thus, 
although the Bill does not contain a flat cap on the use of the homestead exemption, it 
does attack the two leading causes of abuse by imposing a waiting period to prevent eve 
of bankruptcy exemption forum shopping and providing Judges with greater powers to 
attack fraudulent uses of the homestead exemption. 
 
The Bill also takes a major step to reduce other forms of fraud and abuse, including such 
things as the use of "fractional interests" to prevent legitimate foreclosures and abuse of 
the cramdown provisions of the Code by filing bankruptcy simply to strip down the value 
of a secured creditor's claim. It creates new protections from bankruptcy "mills" and 
ensures that bankruptcy filers undergo credit counseling to try to workout a consensual 
solution to their financial problems. In short, it reflects practical solutions grounded in 
common-sense experience regarding the problems in the bankruptcy system. Contrary to 
the selective outrage of its critics, however, the Bill does not limit itself to reducing abuse 
of the homestead exemption but takes a comprehensive approach to rooting out all forms 
of bankruptcy abuse. 
 
In the past, it has been claimed by some that the Bill would negatively impact the ability 
of divorced spouses to collect spousal and child support. This claim is based on vague, 
speculative, and inaccurate accusations about how the nondischargeability of certain 
debts will impact post-petition efforts to collect these obligations. In contrast to these 
speculative accusations, the Bill offers concrete assistance to non-intact families in 
several ways. Among its numerous provisions protecting the rights of former spouses and 
children are the following protections: (1) Extends the scope of nondischargeability of 
spousal support obligations to make nondischargeable certain property settlements, (2) 
excepts state child support collection authorities from the reach of the automatic stay, (3) 
elevates the priority level of child support to first priority, (4) makes exempt property 
available for the enforcement of domestic and child support obligations. It is well- 
established that alimony and child support creditors have a substantial number of tools at 
their disposal that other creditors lack, such as heightened garnishment protections, 
government-assistance in collection, intercept power over tax refunds and government 
benefit payments, and many other protections. It is thus a simple falsehood to charge that 
the effect of the Bill would lead to spousal support creditors having to "compete" with 
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ordinary creditors for payment, because that is simply not the case. If this allegation is 
raised this time, I urge this Committee to ask exactly how this supposed competition 
takes place. The Committee will soon learn, I believe, that the allegation is 
unsubstantiated and amounts to little more than hand-waving. The primary problem for 
spousal support collection today is not a fictional competition with other creditors, but 
rather the obstructions and hurdles imposed by the current bankruptcy laws. The reforms 
in this Bill go a long way toward relieving the hurdles imposed by the bankruptcy laws 
that interfere with effective collection of such obligations today. This Bill unequivocally 
improves the position of divorced spouses attempting to collect alimony, child support, 
and property settlements. For seven years now divorced spouses and children have hoped 
for relief from the traps of the bankruptcy system; now is the time to give it to them. 
 
Balanced bankruptcy reform preserves the protection of the bankruptcy system for those 
who need it, while limiting abuse by those who are preying on that generosity simply to 
evade their financial responsibilities. This Bill brings balance to a consumer bankruptcy 
system that has become a tool for rich and savvy debtors to evade their financial 
responsibilities. America has one of the most charitable and forgiving bankruptcy 
systems in the world and many of those who file bankruptcy truly need it as a 
consequence of personal trouble. But too many people today are preying on our charity 
and using the bankruptcy system not because they need it, but simply to evade their 
responsibilities or to maintain an unrealistic and extravagant lifestyle at the expense of 
those who live responsibly. Ignoring rampant abuse undermines public support for the 
bankruptcy system generally, which will eventually hurt those who legitimately need 
bankruptcy relief. Now is the time to act to reform the bankruptcy laws. This Bill is a 
sensible, balanced, incremental, and well- considered attempt to deal with these problems 
before they become intractable. These reforms will make the bankruptcy system more 
fair, equitable, and efficient, not only for bankruptcy debtors and creditors, but for all 
Americans. 
 
Appendix Understanding the Causes of the Bankruptcy Crisis and the Need for Reform 
 
There is little evidence to support the more general proposition that the rise in consumer 
bankruptcy filings has been caused by an increase in household financial distress rather 
than other factors. This Appendix briefly reviews the evidence regarding the purported 
causes of the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings during the past twenty-five years. More 
detailed discussion can be found at Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, ___ NORTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW ___ 




It has been argued that the upward filing trends of the past twenty-five years has been 
caused by high levels of household financial distress. This argument could explain rising 
bankruptcies in two possible ways. First, it is argued that consumers have "too much 
debt," either because they have borrowed recklessly or because creditors have somehow 
induced them to take on excessive levels of debt, such as through overly- aggressive 
promotion of credit cards. This excessive debt either catapults them into bankruptcy 
directly by making it impossible for them to pay all their debts, or by making them more 
vulnerable to financial shocks. Second, it is argued that unexpected financial shocks to 
consumer households have become more common or more severe, thus generating more 
bankruptcies. Neither of these theories is borne out by the available evidence. Bankruptcy 
has two well-established measures of financial distress and insolvency. The first is 
"equity" or liquidity insolvency, which examines the ability to generally pay one's debts 
as they come due. This measurement is essentially a ratio of one's current income to 
current expenses, including current or monthly payments on debt obligations. The second 
is "balance sheet" or "bankruptcy" insolvency, which finds a debtor to be insolvent if the 
"sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at fair valuation." 
Equity insolvency is a "flow" measure of current income and expenditures; balance sheet 
insolvency is a "stock" measure of total assets and total debt, or household net wealth. 
Equity Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
 
The first way to measure financial condition is through equity insolvency, or the ability to 
pay one's debts as they come due. Since the early 1990s interest rates have fallen and loan 
maturities have lengthened on average. As a result, even though total household 
indebtedness has gradually and consistently risen during this period, the household debt 
service ratio has remained fairly constant. Indeed, it is likely that total indebtedness has 
risen precisely because of falling interest rates and a lengthening of loan maturities. Low 
interest rates enable consumers to borrow more, such as to buy a larger house, without a 
substantial increase in monthly payments. Figure 4 compares the Federal Reserve's 
measurement of the household debt service ratio with consumer bankruptcy filings: 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board Household Debt-Service Burden and Figure 3 Moreover, 
the debt service ratio is relatively constant across households of varying wealth positions, 
in that low, medium, and high-wealth households all spend roughly the same amount of 
their income on current debt-service obligations, although poor and wealthy households 
have slightly lower debt- service burdens than middle-class households. With respect to 
the lowest quintile of income earners, there appears to be little relationship between 
changes in the debt-service burden of the lowest quintile and overall bankruptcy filing 
rates, as shown in Figure 5: 
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances and Figure 3. Whereas the debt service ratio for 
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the lowest income quintile of the population was unchanged between 1995 and 1998, the 
overall bankruptcy filing rate soared. Similarly, whereas the debt service ratio fell from 
1998 to 2001, bankruptcy filings were the same in 1998 and 2001. The debt service ratio 
of the lowest quintile was also the same in 1992 and 2001, but bankruptcies were much 
higher in the latter period. In short, changes in the lowest-income sector of society do not 
explain rising bankruptcy filing rates. Thus, the aggregate debt-service measurements are 
not concealing some sort of unrecognized distress among poor households. 
 
Balance Sheet Insolvency and Bankruptcy A second standard measure of household 
financial condition is the ratio of total assets to total debt, also referred to as "balance 
sheet" or "bankruptcy" insolvency. In the context of consumer households, balance sheet 
insolvency can be measured by household net wealth. Like balance sheet insolvency, 
household net wealth is calculated as the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities. As shown in Figure 6 there has been a dramatic increase in household net 
wealth during the era of the consumer bankruptcy crisis: 
 
Source: Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank Household wealth has risen steadily and 
dramatically over the past several decades. In fact, after a relatively stable level of net 
wealth for over half a century, net wealth began to rise rapidly in the 1970s, accelerating 
in the 1908s, and exploding in the 1990s. At the same time, bankruptcy filings have also 
risen steadily and dramatically. In the mid-1990s, for example, household net wealth 
grew by about ten percent per year, even as bankruptcies jumped as much as twenty 
percent per year. Moreover, the ratio of consumer credit to net worth has remained almost 
perfectly constant at four percent of net worth since 1956. This combination of rising 
bankruptcies and rising personal wealth contradicts the hypothesis that mounting 
bankruptcies reflects increased household financial distress. 
 
Moreover, net wealth has risen for households of all wealth levels, including the poorest 
quintiles. Even though the poor remain poorer than average overall, low-wealth 
households have benefited from the asset growth along with everyone else. As shown in 
Figure 7, the average net worth of the lowest quintile of households has risen slowly but 
steadily over the past decade: 
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances Credit Cards and Bankruptcy It has also been 
argued that increased use of credit cards has led to an increase in consumer indebtedness, 
resulting in more bankruptcies. In fact, credit cards have not worsened household 
financial condition, because although consumers have increased their use of credit cards 
as a borrowing medium, this increase represents primarily a substitution of credit card 
debt for other high-interest consumer debt. For many borrowers, credit card borrowing 
may be an attractive option relative to other corms of credit that are available to them, 
 11 
such as pawn shops, personal finance companies, retail store credit, and layaway plans, 
all of which are either more costly or otherwise less attractive than credit cards. The 
result, therefore, has not been to increase household indebtedness, but primarily to 
change the composition of debt within the household credit portfolio. This is also 
consistent with the finding reported above that the consumer debt- service burden has 
remained largely stable during this period. Figure 8 illustrates the nature of this 
substitution: 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis As Figure 8 indicates, 
the growth in revolving (credit card) debt has largely been a substitution from 
nonrevolving consumer debt to revolving debt, thus leaving overall consumer 
indebtedness (as a percentage of income) largely unaffected. Revolving debt outstanding 
has risen during this period from zero to roughly 9% of outstanding debt. Nonrevolving 
installment debt, by contrast, has fallen from its level of 19% of disposable income in the 
1960s, to roughly 12% today. The increase in revolving debt has been almost exactly 
offset by a decrease in the installment debt burden. In fact the recent bump in total 
indebtedness in recent years was not caused by an increase in revolving debt, which has 
remained largely constant for several years, but by an increase in installment debt, 
primarily as a result of a recent increase in car loans for the purchase of new automobiles. 
Thus, because credit card debt has largely just substituted for other forms of consumer 
debt, there is little indication that increased use of credit cards has precipitated greater 
financial stress among American households. 
 
It also has been argued that credit cards have contributed to increased bankruptcies 
through a profligate expansion of credit card credit to high-risk borrowers, especially 
low-income borrowers. Although often-repeated, empirical studies have failed to support 
this theory. First, as noted, the growth in credit card debt by low-income households 
primarily reflects a substitution for other types of debt, not an overall increase in 
indebtedness. In addition, two studies have examined the hypothesis empirically and have 
found little support. The first study, by economists Donald P. Morgan and Ian Toll 
concludes, "If lenders have become more willing to gamble on credit card loans than on 
other consumer loans credit card charge-offs should be rising at a faster rate [than non-
credit card consumer loans] . . . . Contrary to the supply-side story, charge-offs on other 
consumer loans have risen at virtually the same rate as credit card charge-offs." Donald 
P. Morgan & Ian Toll, Bad Debt Rising, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON AND FIN. 
March 1997, at 1, 4. Thus "suggest[s] that some other force [other than extension of 
credit cards to high-risk borrowers] is driving up bad debt." A second study, by David B. 
Gross and Nicholas S. Souleles, concludes that changes in the risk-composition of credit 
card loan portfolios "explain only a small part of the change in default rates [on credit 
card loans] between 1995 and 1997." David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An 
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Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 319, 
324 (2002). Moreover, if it were true that lower-income households were dramatically 
increasing their indebtedness through credit card increase then this should be reflected in 
the debt service ratio for lower-income households. As previously noted, however, this 
ratio has remained largely constant for lower-income households as with all others. 
Housing Costs and Bankruptcy 
 
A recent book has argued that recent decades have seen an excessive "bidding war" for 
housing that has led to increased financial stress. See ELIZABETH WARREN & 
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS 
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003). Most of the support for the 
"bidding war" hypothesis is anecdotal. The only numerical data offered to support the 
thesis is an example of the balance sheet of an average household in the 1970s compared 
to an average household in the 2000s. Id. at 50-51 But on closer inspection, the data that 
is presented does not support the "bidding war" hypothesis offered up by the authors. In 
the standard one-wage earner household of the 1970s, median income was $38,700. 
Major expenses were $1,030 a year for health insurance, $5,310 in mortgage payments, 
and automobile loan payments and expenses equal $5,410. The effective tax rate was 
24%, equaling $9,288 from the household salary, leaving $17,834 in discretionary 
income. The overall family budget is described in Figure 9: 
 
Source: Warren & Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap In the typical 2000s family with both 
spouses working, total family income is $67,800. Mortgage payments are $9,000, an 
increase of $3,690. The expense of two cars rises to $8,000, or an increase of $2,860. Day 
care is now needed because both parents are working, adding a total of $9,670 for two 
children. Health insurance has increased to $1,650, an increase of $620. Because of 
progressiveness of the tax code, the higher family joint income have increased taxes to 
33%, or a total of $22,374, an increase in $13,086. Discretionary income has, in fact, 
fallen in the second period. But this appears to be primarily the result of a much higher 
tax burden and additional new child care expense. As seen in Figure 10, the supposed 
"bidding war" for housing, by contrast, has increased the family housing expense by only 
$3,690: 
 
Source: Warren & Tyagi, The Two-income Trap As Figure 10 indicates, mortgage, 
automobile, and health insurance expenses have all risen modestly in absolute terms from 
the 1970s to the early 2000s, but all have fallen as a percentage of the family budget. By 
contrast, taxes have increased by over $13,000, almost as much as all of the other 
expenses combined, and over three times the increase in housing expenses. Child care is a 
new expense that represents fourteen percent of the budget. But if the bidding war 
hypothesis is that the spouse is forced to work in order to pay for housing expenses, the 
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fact that the family incurs $9,670 in new child car expenses in order to pay $3,690 in new 
housing expenses is inconsistent with the hypothesis. The Two- Income Trap focuses on 
the reduction in discretionary income between the two periods, but the culprit for this 
appears to be increased taxes and child care expenses, not increased housing expenses. 
Moreover, unlike new taxes and child care expenses, increases in the cost of housing and 
automobiles are offset by increases in the value of real and personal property as 
household assets that are acquired in exchange. In short, even though the debt obligation 
associated with housing has increased in recent years, it is not clear that the "bidding 
war" hypothesis is consistent with either economic theory or available empirical 
evidence. 
 
Moreover, data from the Federal Reserve on the mortgage debt service ratio also fails to 
find any major or consistent upward trend that supports the "bidding war" hypothesis. 
Like the debt- service ratio presented above, the mortgage debt service ratio is the 
percentage of monthly income dedicated to mortgage debt service. Over the past twenty 
years the mortgage debt service ratio has hovered within a narrow range between 5.01 
and 6.35 percent of monthly income, rising from 1982 until 1991, then falling back off 
before rising slightly above 6 percent again in 2000, as shown in Figure 11: 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board and Figure 3 Thus, the mortgage debt service ratio has 
increased, but only slightly--a little over one percent of income--which is certainly not 
enough to explain the increase in bankruptcies. In addition, default rates on mortgages 
have remained fairly constant for many years. Moreover, while both the debt service ratio 
and financial obligations ratio has been constant for homeowners during this period, it is 
renters, not homeowners, who have experienced an increase in their financial obligations. 
On average, renters spend 17 percent of their total after-tax income on rent payments, 
more than twice as much in percentage terms than homeowners. If anything, therefore, 
the financial condition of homeowners has improved dramatically relative to that of 
renters during the past decade. 
 
Unemployment and Bankruptcy It has also been argued that factors such as 
unemployment has led to increased bankruptcy filings. This claim is not sustained by the 
evidence: 
 
Divorce and Bankruptcy Nor do trends in divorce rates appear to explain the bankruptcy 
crisis: 
 
Alternative Explanations It thus appears that the surge in consumer bankruptcy filings 
cannot be explained by a rise in household financial distress. What then explains the 
dramatic rise in bankruptcy filings during the past twenty-five years? 
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Two identifiable factors present themselves as explaining the rise in consumer 
bankruptcy filings in recent decades. First is a general decline in the personal shame and 
social stigma associated with bankruptcy. Second is a change in the relative costs and 
benefits associated with filing bankruptcy. 
 
There is also little question that the social stigma associated with filing bankruptcy has 
declined over time. A few years ago, singer Toni Braxton filed bankruptcy, despite 
having recorded two albums that had earned $170 million in sales at the time, and despite 
owning a baby grand piano, a Porsche, and Lexus. She later appeared on Oprah Winfrey, 
who questioned Toni on her purchase of $1,000 in Gucci silverware shortly before filing 
bankruptcy. Toni's response: "I only spent about $1,000 on it. If that made me broke, then 
I was truly in bad shape. It's Gucci- -I love it. I'd buy it again. And now that I get a huge 
discount because I've given them so much pub, I can really shop." This attitude, of 
course, is not limited to pop music stars, as evidenced by the comments of one individual 
to CNNfn, "When I found out--this was watching it on the news, in the newspapers-- that 
more and more people are doing it [filing bankruptcy], and . . . it's not just a middle class 
you know, upper class too--rich people--everybody's doing it. And . . . I said: Why not 
me? You know, I'm just one more of them." Indeed, several scholars have attributed the 
rise in consumer bankruptcy filings to a decline in the traditional social "stigma" 
associated with filing bankruptcy. A review and summary of many of these articles can 
be found in, Gordon Bermant, What's Stigma Got to Do with It?, ABI JOURNAL 22 
(July/August 2003) 
 
Moreover, the excessive generosity of the current American bankruptcy system has also 
spurred more bankruptcy filings. It has been estimated that one-third of Americans would 
benefit financially from filing bankruptcy after engaging in some basic pre-bankruptcy 
planning. Moreover, because of the structure of property exemptions under bankruptcy 
and state law, wealthier individuals gain the greatest benefits from filing bankruptcy 
because they can protect larger amounts of property in bankruptcy. Given the financial 
benefits created by the enactment of the 1978 Code, it is little wonder that consumers 
have increasingly recognized and acted on the financial benefits of filing bankruptcy. 
 
At the same time, the costs of learning about and filing bankruptcy have decreased 
dramatically. Daytime television and the Yellow Pages are awash in bankruptcy 
advertisements. The mass production of bankruptcy petitions by bankruptcy lawyers have 
driven down prices for bankruptcy services. In fact, scholars have reported that one of the 
most difficult tasks confronting lawyers is persuading their clients that there really is no 
catch to filing bankruptcy, because clients routinely object that the whole things sounds 
"too good to be true." 
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The role of attorney advertising and decreasing costs of learning about bankruptcy may 
be illustrated by the following chart: 
 
As this chart indicates, there appears to be a very strong correlation between attorney 
advertising and consumer bankruptcy filings. Of course, there are limitations to the 
inferences that can be drawn from this chart. The chart measures all advertising, not just 
bankruptcy advertising. Moreover, it is focused purely on television advertising and 
ignores other sources of advertising. Nonetheless, attorney advertising for bankruptcy 
services seems to comprise a substantial portion of attorney advertising in general, and 
may comprise even a larger percentage of advertising in non-television outlets, such as 
Yellow Pages, newspaper, Internet, and radio advertising. 
